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I. INTRODUCTION 
It is difficult to ignore the term “the peace” in post-Revolutionary legal 
records, particularly the records of public matters in local courts. In fact, the term 
is so ubiquitous that it is tempting to ignore it as yet another piece of formulaic 
phrasing that dominates such materials. The peace, however, was unlike other 
pieces of legal boilerplate of the time. It appeared so often because it actually was 
meaningful. The peace, which had deep roots in Anglo-American law and 
expressed the ideal order of the metaphorical public body, was the central 
governing concept in public matters in the decades following the Revolution. 
In theory, the peace distinguished between law and society. But in practice, 
the two were so thoroughly intertwined that it is difficult to sort out where one 
began and the other ended. The point of this legal concept was to maintain the 
social order, as it was defined in particular places. The results moved the legal 
process into social relations, so that law both guided and emerged from the 
dynamics of people’s lives. Legal principles were subordinate to the social results, 
defined as a just outcome that restored the particular social order as it actually 
existed in daily life. Just as the peace encompassed both law and society, it also 
merged other dynamics that legal historians now tend to separate into different, if 
not oppositional categories. The peace acknowledged and accepted conflict, even 
 
 *   The author would like to thank Chris Tomlins for the invitation to present at the “‘Law As . . .’: 
Theory and Method in Legal History” conference and for his thoughts in revising that presentation 
into this Article. She would also like to thank the members of that conference for their stimulating 
discussions of the meaning of law. 
Assembled_Issue_3 v5 (Do Not Delete) 2/22/2012  9:07 AM 
566 UC IRVINE LAW REVIEW [Vol.  1:3 
 
as it sought to restore consensus; it incorporated dissent and change, even as it 
sought to maintain the status quo; it responded to individual, highly personal 
complaints, even as it ignored individual rights; and it included a wide range of 
people in its workings, even as it sought to uphold the rigid hierarchies of the 
post-Revolutionary social order. 
The peace is directly related to the idea of “Law As . . .,” which explores the 
utility of the rubric that separates “law” from “society.” This separation marks the 
intellectual movement known as “law and society.”1 But it also structures the basic 
analytical frameworks in the field of legal history. Legal historians study “the law” 
as a distinct topic. If law is not distinct from society, what is legal history?  
The operation of the peace in the post-Revolutionary United States, which 
did not follow this kind of conceptual separation, raises important questions about 
what the law is, where it is made, and how to follow its history.2 Those questions 
have both historical and conceptual implications. In historical terms, the peace 
localizes our perspective on law. In one sense, localization is about the 
institutional geography of the legal system because the peace shifts our attention 
to the local legal venues where this concept dominated and away from courts and 
legislative bodies at the federal and state level which have been the traditional 
focus of legal history. Localization, however, is not just about institutional 
geography. The peace literally located the law in actual social relations, which gave 
people a very different position in the law’s formulation and application. That 
logic applied beyond particular geographic areas to define the era’s legal culture 
more generally, a situation so historically specific that there is no direct analogy 
between the post-Revolutionary period and today.3  
The logic of the peace then fundamentally challenges the conceptual 
frameworks that structure legal history now. In other words, the logic of the peace 
reveals the distinct limits of the way we now define the law in opposition to those 
things associated with society.  
 
1. The work on the relationship between law and society is vast, capacious, and 
interdisciplinary. It is associated with the pioneering work of James Willard Hurst, rooted in the 
development of the social sciences in the first half of the twentieth century, and institutionalized in 
the form of the Law and Society Association and various journals, including Law & Social Inquiry. The 
influence of Hurst and his particular vision of law and society are brilliantly and thoroughly discussed 
in a special commemorative issue of 18 LAW & HIST. REV. 1 (2000). In this Article, I am talking more 
specifically about the relationship between law and society in the field of history, although many of 
the issues extend to other disciplines as well. 
2. I am building, here, on the work of other legal historians, who have been influenced by 
Critical Legal Studies (CLS) and who have posited the presence of multiple versions of law and, by 
extension, opened up the possibility for multiple narratives within legal history. For a brilliant 
discussion of the implications of CLS for legal history, see Robert W. Gordon, Critical Legal Histories, 
36 STAN. L. REV. 57 (1984). 
3. For the importance of popular culture in legal discourse in this period, see STEVEN WILF, 
LAW’S IMAGINED REPUBLIC (2010). For the importance of localism, see WILLIAM J. NOVAK, THE 
PEOPLE’S WELFARE (1996). 
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Society is a powerful concept in our historical frameworks. Among other 
things, it provides a binary point of reference that offers an explanation for every 
complication which does not fit our definition of the law, both clarifying what the 
law is and negating the need for further analysis of it. The logic of the peace, 
however, integrated law and society without erasing the distinction between the 
two, which suggests that this conceptual binary is anything but normative. More 
than that, the peace suggests that this binary comes at a cost, narrowing and 
isolating the field of legal history.4 
This Article explores the implications of the peace for our conceptions of 
legal history by drawing and expanding on my recent book, The People and Their 
Peace: Legal Culture and the Transformation of Inequality in the Post-Revolutionary South. 
While drawing on this book, I am amplifying one of its main arguments by 
emphasizing the conceptual nature of localism, rather than its geographic location 
in local legal institutions.5 This element of the peace meant that law was literally 
constituted through social relationships. That situation represents a different 
relationship between law and society than the one most historians now assume. It 
also poses broader questions about the conceptual location and production of law 
by extending the field into the lives of ordinary people, the workings of local 
communities, and the new regions of the country. This wider perspective then 
suggests new conceptual frames for making generalizations about legal change. 
II. LEGAL HISTORY AND “THE PEACE”? 
Legal historians usually enter their research assuming the presence of the law 
as a readily identifiable, unified body of rules, enforced uniformly by a centralized 
 
4. There is a strong body of legal history that integrates formal law with various aspects of 
social, economic, cultural, and political currents and that emphasizes the relationship between formal 
law and cultural dynamics at different points in U.S. history. See, e.g., CORNELIA HUGHES DAYTON, 
WOMEN BEFORE THE BAR 1639–1789 (1995); SARAH BARRINGER GORDON, THE MORMON 
QUESTION (2002); MICHAEL GROSSBERG, A JUDGMENT FOR SOLOMON (1996); HENDRIK 
HARTOG, MAN AND WIFE IN AMERICA (2002) [hereinafter HARTOG, MAN AND WIFE]; BRUCE 
MANN, NEIGHBORS AND STRANGERS (1987); CHRISTOPHER L. TOMLINS, FREEDOM BOUND 1580–
1865 (2010)[hereinafter TOMLINS, FREEDOM BOUND]; Hendrik Hartog, Lawyering, Husbands’ Rights, 
and “the Unwritten Law” in Nineteenth-Century America, 84 J. AM. HIST. 67 (1997). Ariela Gross’s work on 
the historical construction of race also makes the conceptual point that legal rules on this issue were 
often constructed in a way that required context to understand their meaning and application. See 
generally ARIELA GROSS, DOUBLE CHARACTER (2000) [hereinafter GROSS, DOUBLE CHARACTER); 
ARIELA GROSS, WHAT BLOOD WON’T TELL (2008); Ariela Gross, Beyond Black and White: Cultural 
Approaches to Race and Slavery, 101 COLUM. L. REV. 640 (2001) [hereinafter Gross, Beyond Black and 
White]. I am making different, historical claims in this article. First, I am arguing that legal institutions 
and legal culture in the post-Revolutionary period was such that people did not make the sharp 
separation between formal law and social relations that was assumed in later periods of history. 
Second, I am arguing that even the most sophisticated renderings of the relationship between law and 
society still rely on relatively recent notions of that separation which does not describe the situation in 
the post-Revolutionary decades. 
5. See generally LAURA F. EDWARDS, THE PEOPLE AND THEIR PEACE (2009). 
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institutional structure. It is an assumption fraught with difficulties because this 
kind of legal system did not exist, for the most part, in the post-Revolutionary 
United States. While acknowledging that historical context, legal historians usually 
deal with it by leaving the assumptions about law in place and then focusing on 
the development of what we want, but so often fail to find. We focus on evidence 
that affirms the growth of unified bodies of law and centralized institutional 
structures. There is nothing inherently wrong with studying law in these terms. 
Such a legal system did, in fact, emerge in the United States, so it makes sense to 
chart its evolution.6 This approach, however, becomes problematic when it 
ignores the accompanying conceptual baggage, which is packed with assumptions 
about the nature of law and its production, not all of which are useful. The bags 
are so full that there is not much room for anything else, particularly contradictory 
or even complicating evidence. In fact, legal historians tend to explain away such 
evidence in terms of “fit.” We label these circumstances as undeveloped, 
backward, dysfunctional, or utterly different—the unfortunate results of social 
forces that delayed or distorted the law’s development. Those conclusions are 
satisfying only insofar as they do not force a reconsideration of the conceptual 
framework that led us to them in the first place. The results have circumscribed 
the field, excluding entire time periods and areas of the country from the narrative 
outlines of the legal history, including the first half-century or more of U.S. 
history; the South; areas in the Midwest and West during the formative periods of 
settlement; states that retained French or Spanish legal traditions; all local 
jurisdictions; and almost everyone without legal training or not involved in 
litigation. The exclusions then generate hierarchies. Case law and legislation at the 
state and national levels constitute law in a way that local legal matters do not. The 
Northeast and Midwest, to some extent, can represent the trajectory of legal 
change in the United States as a whole, but the South and West cannot.7 
 
6. The broad pattern of change has been of primary importance for legal historians. The 
classic statements subsumed questions of institutional change within analysis of the law’s relationship 
to capitalistic development. See generally MORTON J. HORWITZ, THE TRANSFORMATION OF 
AMERICAN LAW, 1780–1860 (1977); JAMES WILLARD HURST, LAW AND THE CONDITIONS OF 
FREEDOM (1956). Also see the exchange in 115 AM. HIST. REV. 766 (2010), with writings by Julia 
Adams, Gary Gerstle, and John Witt in response to William J. Novak, The Myth of the “Weak” American 
State, 113 AM. HIST. REV. 752 (2008). Recent historical scholarship has focused more particularly on 
the process of legal centralization, the displacement of localized practices, and the timing of those 
changes, emphasizing the importance of the earlier period in its own right, rather than as a moment of 
transition, important primarily for what it says about what will come later. See generally LARRY D. 
KRAMER, THE PEOPLE THEMSELVES (2004); MANN, supra note 4; NOVAK, supra note 3; 
CHRISTOPHER L. TOMLINS, LAW, LABOR, AND IDEOLOGY IN THE EARLY AMERICAN REPUBLIC 
(1993); TOMLINS, FREEDOM BOUND, supra note 4; Hendrik Hartog, The Public Law of a County Court: 
Judicial Government in Eighteenth-Century Massachusetts, 20 AM. J. LEGAL HIST. 282 (1976). 
7. James Vernon’s work on English political history has relevance for the issue in U.S. legal 
history. He argues that English political history has not only followed the development of the 
centralized, liberal state, but also made its ascension seem so inevitable that this one story has become 
the only one. See JAMES VERNON, POLITICS AND THE PEOPLE, C. 1815–1867 (1993); JAMES 
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These exclusions and hierarchies rely, to some degree, on the conceptual 
separation of law from society. That framework has been the source of both 
analytical inspiration and heated debate among legal historians. It is resilient 
because it structures the basic concepts that define legal history as a field. The 
backdrop of society provides the means for identifying the law and charting its 
complicated development. The scholarship that places law and society in a 
dynamic relationship has reshaped the terrain of the field by joining the two sides. 
But society also provides a convenient conceptual place to put all the challenging 
issues which we would rather avoid. The resulting tensions structure key debates 
in the field, such as the growth of the state and the reach of state authority, to 
name just two. Even legal historians who question the binary still tend to 
reproduce it because the terms are so difficult to escape. We depend on it to 
explain what we study.8 Legal historians write about the law. We need an 
identifiable topic—the law—in order to be legal historians. But there also needs to 
be closer examination of how we define what the law is. In particular, framing the 
law as a unified concept, defined in opposition to society, comes at a cost, one 
that narrows the terms of our scholarship by locating the law in some places and 
not in others. 
The logic of the peace, as practiced in local jurisdictions in the post-
Revolutionary South, provides a different, more comprehensive framework in 
which to explore the history of the law. What was the peace? The peace was 
embedded within the highly localized legal order that emerged as a result of the 
Revolution. After breaking with England, lawmakers in most states decentralized 
the most important functions of government, drawing on Revolutionary ideology, 
established elements of Anglo-American law, and undercurrents of local political 
unrest. These changes dramatically altered the existing structures of imperial rule 
by placing a great deal of government business in local venues that we identify 
with the legal system. The most visible of these venues were the circuit courts, 
which met on a regular schedule in county seats or court towns, held jury trials, 
 
VERNON, RE-READING THE CONSTITUTION (1996). The critique is applicable to U.S. legal history, 
where there is a concentration of work on the Northeast, because that area most closely fits the 
model of centralization and systematization associated with liberal states. It is not coincidental that 
most of the work in note 4 focuses on the Northeast, with only a few, brief forays South; the 
exception is Christopher Tomlins’ Freedom Bound, which explicitly folds questions of slavery into a 
broader analysis of freedom in American culture. TOMLINS, FREEDOM BOUND, supra note 4. By 
contrast, legal histories of other regions tend to focus on specific regional issues: race and slavery in 
the South; immigration restrictions, ethnicity, railroads, and environmental issues in the West. 
8. The difficulties are most apparent in historians’ attempts to reconcile the unexpected 
outcomes of particular cases, often at the local level, and with legal rules defined at the state or 
national level. Instead of allowing for contradictions within the workings of the law, the explanation is 
often some form of the argument that social forces overwhelmed the law, which posits a uniform 
conception of the law and attributes complications to society, even while reaching for more 
complicated understandings of both law and society.  
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and dealt with a great deal of government business. But circuit courts were only 
the most conspicuous part of a system dominated by even more localized legal 
proceedings, including magistrates’ hearings and trials, inquests, and other ad hoc 
legal forums. Magistrates not only screened cases and tried minor offenses, but 
also kept tabs on a range of matters involving markets and morals. In most legal 
matters, the interested parties collected evidence, gathered witnesses, and 
represented themselves. Cases were decided by common law in its traditional 
sense as a flexible collection of principles rooted in local custom, but that also 
included an array of texts and principles as potential sources for authoritative legal 
principles. Each jurisdiction produced inconsistent rulings, aimed at restoring the 
peace in particular matters, rather than producing a uniform, comprehensive body 
of law.9 
In practice, the peace tended to root the law and legal practice in particular 
localities because that was where the social relationships necessary to its workings 
were embodied. But it was those social relationships, as much as geography, that 
defined the boundaries of local jurisdictions. The locality could be a handful of 
close neighbors who gathered at a magistrate’s hearing; hundreds of people 
connected loosely through knowledge of a case being tried at the district court; or 
the dozen or so members of a tight-knit family scattered over hundreds of miles, 
but united in their determination to influence a particular legal matter. The point 
was to sort through the conflict, whatever it might be, and restore the social 
order.10  
The social order of the peace was profoundly patriarchal. The concept was 
based in a long-standing, highly gendered construction of government authority, 
which subordinated everyone to a sovereign body, just as all individual dependents 
were subordinated to specific male heads of household. That metaphorical body 
was represented first through the King and then, after the Revolution, through 
“the people,” via the agency of the state—although the state’s form was still an 
open question in the post-Revolutionary decades, a situation that made it possible 
to locate so much governing authority at the local level. The sovereign body, 
though, was always a patriarch, whatever its location or physical embodiment. 
That remained the same whether sovereignty resided in local jurisdictions or 
centralized institutions or whether it took the form of a male king, a female queen, 
or a combination of men and women from different social ranks as “the people,” 
as was the case after the Revolution.11 
 
9. See EDWARDS, supra note 5, especially at chapters 3–4. 
10. Id. at ch. 2, 203–19. 
11. EDWARDS, supra note 5. See also JOAN B. LANDES, WOMEN AND PUBLIC SPHERE IN THE 
AGE OF THE FRENCH REVOLUTION (1988); CAROLE PATEMAN, THE SEXUAL CONTRACT (1988); 
Nancy Fraser & Linda Gordon, A Genealogy of Dependency: Tracing a Keyword of the U.S. Welfare State, 19 
SIGNS: J. WOMEN CULTURE & SOC’Y 309, 309–36 (1994). For historical analyses that explore the 
particulars of these changes, see SUSAN DWYER AMUSSEN, AN ORDERED SOCIETY: GENDER AND 
CLASS IN EARLY MODERN ENGLAND (1988); KATHLEEN M. BROWN, GOOD WIVES, NASTY 
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Even after the Revolution, the peace remained coercively inclusive, enclosing 
everyone in its patriarchal embrace and raising its collective interests over those of 
any given subject. It was a form of inclusion that did not have anything to do with 
democracy. Keeping the peace meant keeping everyone—from the lowest to the 
highest—in their appropriate places, as defined in specific local contexts. Those 
contexts, while different in their own ways, were defined by stark, entrenched 
inequalities. This patriarchal system neither protected the interests nor recognized 
the rights of free women or slaves. Yet it still incorporated subordinates into its 
basic workings because they were part of the social order that the legal process 
was charged with maintaining. The peace kept them in their places. Its workings 
also depended on the information they provided about the social order. To the 
extent that individuals figured in the logic of the peace, it was through hierarchical 
family and community relationships that connected them to the social order and 
made them part of the peace.12 
Not all areas of law and government were governed by the peace. Property 
law, as developed in equity and common law, had been claimed by lawyers even 
before the Revolution. In colonial economies that looked outward to the Atlantic 
world, knowledge of property law was crucial to economic success. By the time of 
the Revolution, links to international markets resulted in the development of 
relatively sophisticated financial structures to assist in property exchange, capital 
formation, and the management of credit and debt. That was true even in the 
backcountry, which lagged behind coastal areas economically. The influence of 
professionalized law was pervasive enough that even ordinary economic 
transactions, such as the purchase of land, required the interposition of lawyers. 
Lawyers solidified their hold on property and commerce in the decades following 
the Revolution, given the unsettled state of the economy, the scarcity of cash and 
credit, and the uncertainty of land titles in the post-Revolutionary years. The trend 
continued into the nineteenth century, largely because of the widespread use of 
notes, mortgages, and other instruments of debt as the primary means of 
economic exchange and capital formation. Over time, property law became even 
more professionalized, with standardized rules used by lawyers throughout the 
state. As such, it was more easily organized into a coherent body of law and 
centralized at the state level because the legal practice had already moved in that 
direction. Indeed, the preponderance of property cases—civil cases—in circuit 
courts and at the appellate level registered the relative inaccessibility of this area of 
 
WENCHES, AND ANXIOUS PATRIARCHS (1996); CAROL KARLSEN, THE DEVIL IN THE SHAPE OF A 
WOMAN (1987); LINDA K. KERBER, WOMEN OF THE REPUBLIC (1980).  
 
12. See Laura Edwards, Status Without Rights: African-Americans and the Tangled History of Law and 
Governance in the Nineteenth-Century U.S. South, AM. HIST. REV. (Apr. 29, 2011), http://www. 
historycooperative.org/journals/ahr/112.2/edwards.html; see also Laura Edwards, Enslaved Women and 
the Law: The Paradoxes of Subordination in the Post-Revolutionary Carolinas, 26 SLAVERY & ABOLITION 305 
(2005). See generally EDWARDS, supra note 5, at ch. 3–4.  
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law.13 
The peace held sway over everything else—a broad, ambiguous area of 
public law, which included all crimes as well as a range of ill-defined offenses that 
disrupted the patriarchal order of the peace. Although definitive in the abstract, 
the peace was purposefully illusive in practice because it both governed and was 
constituted by specific personal relationships and accepted practices that varied 
widely from locality to locality. In fact, the peace meant nothing in the absence of 
the actual social relationships, a situation that placed people at the center of legal 
practice in a very literal sense. Even the process itself depended on people’s active 
participation. To mobilize the peace, someone had to identify instances of 
disorder and bring them to the attention of legal authorities. Individuals might 
complain of issues that affected their interests, but they were just as likely to 
provide information about wrongs done to others. As such, the peace only 
acquired meaning through people’s efforts to define it.14 
Complaints only gained traction if it was clear that the incident involved a 
threat to the public order. That standard was more accommodating than we might 
expect because the peace folded everyone into its jurisdiction. Even those without 
rights—wives, children, servants, and slaves, all of whom were legally 
subordinated to their household heads, as well as free blacks, unmarried free 
women, and poor whites, whose race, class, and gender marked them as 
subordinates—had direct access to this arena of law. They also had some 
influence over it, but only through the relationships that subordinated them within 
 
13. See EDWARDS, supra note 5, at 79–80.  
14. The summary draws on Edwards, supra note 5, chs. 3–4. The analysis also draws on legal 
dynamics that scholars often associate with the early modern period in England and the colonial era 
in British North America. See CORNELIA HUGHES DAYTON, WOMEN BEFORE THE BAR (1995); 
LAURA GOWING, DOMESTIC DANGERS: WOMEN, WORDS, AND SEX IN EARLY MODERN LONDON 
(1996); CYNTHIA B. HERRUP, THE COMMON PEACE: PARTICIPATION AND THE CRIMINAL LAW IN 
SEVENTEENTH-CENTURY ENGLAND (1987); TIM STRETTON, WOMEN WAGING LAW IN 
ELIZABETHAN ENGLAND (1998); LINDA L. STURTZ, WITHIN HER POWER: PROPERTIED WOMEN 
IN COLONIAL VIRGINIA (2002); Cornelia Hughes Dayton, Turning Points and the Relevance of Colonial 
Legal History, 50 WM. & MARY Q. 7–17 (1993); Hendrik Hartog, The Public Law of a County Court, 20 
AM. J. LEGAL HIST. 282, 282–329 (1976); MANN, supra note 4. In the context of colonial North 
America and the United States, much of the work focuses on very specific areas or on property law, 
the area of law that was professionalized first. The result is to underestimate the power and 
persistence of such practices. In legal history, Novak, supra note 3, argues that legal professionals 
defended localism; by implication, the legal practices associated with localism persisted into the 
nineteenth century. TOMLINS, FREEDOM BOUND, supra note 4, makes a stronger argument for 
localism in relation to labor law, arguing that labor—like other economic matters—were assumed to 
be police matters, dealt with democratically, if not locally, rather than matters determined by judges 
and courts. Nineteenth-century historians also have noted the presence of such dynamics. See 
SHARON BLOCK, RAPE AND SEXUAL POWER IN EARLY AMERICA (2006); ALLEN STEINBERG, THE 
TRANSFORMATION OF CRIMINAL JUSTICE: PHILADELPHIA, 1800–1880 (1989); Michael P. Johnson, 
Denmark Vesey and His Co-Conspirators, 58 WM. & MARY Q. 915 (2001); James D. Rice, The Criminal 
Trial Before and After the Lawyers: Authority, Law, and Culture in Maryland Jury Trials, 1681–1837, 40 AM. J. 
LEGAL HIST. 455, 455–75 (1996). 
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families and communities, not through recognition of their individual rights. 
Similarly, white patriarchs exercised domestic authority at the behest of the peace, 
not in their own right. When their actions disturbed the peace, whether through 
inadequate or excessive use of authority, they experienced censure. Keeping the 
peace meant keeping everyone—from the lowest to the highest—in their 
appropriate places, as defined in specific local contexts.15 
The resolution of conflicts and resulting statements about the law also 
involved people. Judgments rested on the situated knowledge of observers and 
depended on an individual’s “credit” (also known as character or reputation), 
which was established through family and neighborly ties and continually assessed 
through gossip networks. Local officials and juries judged the reliability of 
testimony based on an individual’s credit as well as on impersonal, prescriptive 
markers of status such as gender, race, age, or class. In this system, the words of 
subordinates could assume considerable legal authority, just as the words of some 
white men might have no standing at all. It depended on what people knew about 
the person.16 
The peace dealt with situations that might not have had legal standing in 
other areas of the system because the goal was to preserve accepted practice in 
particular relationships and places. Magistrates recognized that wives and slaves 
controlled property, even though they could not own it in other areas of law. The 
point was to keep the property where it belonged, not to uphold property rights. 
Magistrates prosecuted husbands, fathers, and even masters for violence against 
their wives, children, and slaves because the authority granted to heads of 
household was not absolute, but contingent on the maintenance of the social 
order. The point was to keep flagrant abuses of power in check so that households 
did not fall apart, not to attend to the individual rights of either household heads 
or dependents. Cases moved forward on information supplied by people unable to 
prosecute cases, because they were part of the social order and had knowledge of 
it, even if they did not have the legal standing to prosecute cases themselves. The 
point was to make sure that the proper information reached the legal system, so 
that officials could act on it, not to ignore obvious social problems because of 
 
15. See EDWARDS, supra note 5, at ch. 3–4.  
16. This analysis owes to recent scholarship in U.S. legal history that has explored the ways 
that people who did not have formally recognized individual rights nonetheless influenced legal 
proceedings and the content of law. GROSS, DOUBLE CHARACTER, supra note 4; HARTOG, MAN 
AND WIFE IN AMERICA, supra note 4; DYLAN C. PENNIGROTH, THE CLAIMS OF KINFOLK (2002); 
Gross, Beyond Black & White, supra note 4. The analysis also builds on literature that explores the 
political agency of African Americans, even when they did not have civil and political rights. See 
STEPHANIE M.H. CAMP, ENSLAVED WOMEN AND EVERYDAY RESISTANCE IN THE PLANTATION 
SOUTH (2004); STEVEN HAHN, A NATION UNDER OUR FEET (2003); WALTER JOHNSON, SOUL BY 
SOUL (1999); WILLIAM A. LINK, ROOTS OF SECESSION (2003); HEATHER ANDREA WILLIAMS, SELF 
TAUGHT (2005); Elsa Barkley Brown, Negotiating and Transforming the Public Sphere: African American 
Political Life in the Transition from Slavery to Freedom, 7 PUB. CULTURE 107 (1994); Walter Johnson, On 
Agency, 37 J. SOC. HIST. 113 (2003). 
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legal technicalities.17 
The effects of legal decisions remained with the particular people involved, 
because the system was so personalized. One person’s experience did not transfer 
to another person of similar status (defined by such characteristics as gender, race, 
or class) or predict any other case’s outcome. These disparate outcomes coexisted 
as options and alternatives, rather than contradictions requiring rationalization. 
The result was a legal system composed of inconsistent local rulings which rather 
than providing precedent, offered options from which to choose; there was no 
uniform “law” to which to appeal. The law existed only in the lived context of 
people’s lives—what we call society today and distinguish from the law.18 
Ordinary people—men and women, rich and poor, free and enslaved, young and 
old, even those without rights—influenced localized law in a basic, structural 
sense. We usually do not think of ordinary people as central in the production of 
law, particularly in this period, when so many of them did not have the individual 
rights that we assume necessary to provide the standing required to pursue legal 
matters. But these people, the contours of their lives, and the body of knowledge 
upon which they drew, actually constituted law.19 
III. THE PEACE AND PEOPLE’S RELATIONSHIP TO LAW 
Within the logic of the peace, people had a direct relationship to the law. 
Both the legal process and the law’s content depended on their presence. That 
relationship widens legal history’s analytical frame, decentering the traditional 
emphasis on statutes, appellate cases, and the development of legal abstractions 
and opening up new questions about legal history, particularly the legal status of 
the nation’s people. The traditional concerns of legal historians are closely tied to 
the field’s focus on the development of law at the state and national jurisdictions. 
In these institutional arenas, the law is created through statutes and appellate 
decisions. Its point is the identification, preservation, and application of legal 
principles, many of which frame individual interests and public concerns in terms 
of the abstraction of individual rights. Individual rights, however, did not figure 
centrally in the workings of the peace. Even when people pursued their own 
interests, the peace did not treat their claims as expressions of rights. Nor did it 
treat the claimants as legally recognized, autonomous individuals who exercised 
agency on their own behalf through the possession of rights. In the logic of the 
peace, the people existed as embodied individuals, not as abstractions with rights. 
Yet much of the historiography traces the people’s relationship to the law in terms 
of the abstraction of rights, rather than their access to the system and their place 
in the practice of law. To view changes in the legal system’s history in terms of the 
 
17. See generally EDWARDS, supra note 5, at ch. 4. 
18. Id. at ch. 1. 
19. See id. at ch. 3–6. 
Assembled_Issue_3 v5 (Do Not Delete) 2/22/2012  9:07 AM 
2011] THE PEACE 575 
 
abstraction of individual rights is not only to misconstrue its most basic dynamics, 
but also to miss its most fundamental changes. The better question is how and 
when rights became so central in configuring people’s relationship to the law. 
From this perspective, legal change looks less like the progressive extension of 
rights to previously excluded groups of the population and more like the 
imposition of a new framework that exacerbated existing inequalities through the 
rhetoric of equality. A system based in individual rights made subordinate people 
without rights even more vulnerable than they already were by cutting off all 
access to the legal system.20  
The meanings attached to the term “local” are critical in maintaining the 
analytical framework of individual rights within the field of legal history. The 
peace was tied to a localized system. Within legal history and among academic 
historians more generally, it is difficult to acknowledge that anything local could 
be of historical significance, because historiographical conventions consign local 
history to antiquarians, based on the assumption that provincial places were 
historically marginal in the past and therefore are inconsequential for 
understanding historical change. In legal history, the pejorative connotations so 
often applied to all things local reach back even further, to post-Revolutionary 
leaders bent on creating strong state and national governing institutions and 
uniform bodies of law. These men, most of whom were professionally trained 
lawyers, were part of a national network that applied revolutionary ideals to create 
rationalized bodies of law and institutions of governance. For many, one of the 
most pressing concerns in the post-Revolutionary decades was the solidification of 
the state’s legal authority. State institutions, as they envisioned the situation, would 
produce and maintain a uniform body of law based on the protection of individual 
rights. To realize that goal, reformers faced two obstacles: the logic of the peace 
and the authority of local jurisdictions, obstructions so entwined that they 
appeared as a single problem, namely localized law.21 
History proved crucial to the task. As reformers worked to create uniform 
bodies of law, first in property issues and then in public matters, they also 
compiled documentary sources and constructed narratives that obscured the fact 
that local jurisdictions actually had authority over a broad range of public matters. 
In these materials, they cast localized law as an archaic throwback, which 
inevitably gave way to progressive change as laws were standardized and rights 
were uniformly defined and applied. In the process, reformers generated a set of 
expectations about where the law resided and how it moved through the system. 
Not only did reformers separate “the state” from “the local,” but they also 
associated the state with other kinds of legal practices and insisted on their 
superiority. Reformers had such confidence in this vision of the legal system that 
 
20. Id. at ch. 7.  
21. Id. at ch. 2.  
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they described it in normative terms: since there was no other option, the system 
evolved naturally—if somewhat haltingly and fitfully—in this direction. Their 
rhetoric, so powerfully articulated in the archival sources, has embedded their 
vision within the historiography.22  
The localized system of the peace, however, was not local in the way that 
state reformers or later historians portrayed it. The term referred to a conceptual 
approach to the law as much as its institutional or geographic location. It was not 
so much backward and doomed as it was popular and powerful. In the post-
Revolutionary system governed by the peace, law was everywhere and nowhere. 
The legal system dealt with a wide variety of issues in this period, including poor 
relief, public health, and economic regulation. While these matters were attended 
to locally, there was no single location for law. Those towns where circuit courts 
met were likely to have courthouses. But, since legislators kept breaking up 
existing districts and adding new ones to accommodate the growth of the 
population and its westward movement, circuit courts met in whatever buildings 
were large enough until courthouses were built. These early courthouses tended to 
be unremarkable in style. Although distinguished by their size, they blended in 
with the other buildings in town. Many were multipurpose public buildings used 
for other meetings and events when court was not in session; they lacked offices, 
document storerooms, and other specialized spaces that became standard in later 
courthouse designs. Particularly in the first few decades following the Revolution, 
people did not associate the legal system with courthouses or other specifically 
designated public structures; most legal proceedings were conducted elsewhere.23 
In fact, the practice of law moved around promiscuously, following the 
officials who oversaw it and going to the people it served. When people had a 
complaint, they initiated the legal process by going to find a magistrate—the 
official who presided at the first, busiest level of the legal system. Magistrates 
heard complaints when and where they received them, in the fields where they had 
been working or even from the beds where they had been sleeping. Then they 
held hearings and trials in convenient spots that could accommodate a crowd—
taverns, country stores, front porches, a room in the magistrate’s house if large 
enough or, if not, under a canopy of trees outside.24 
The law’s proximity was conceptual as well as physical. People of all kinds 
approached law with an air of proprietary familiarity, assuming that they could use 
 
22. Id. at 8–13, 29–40. 
23. Id. at 67–68, 205–19. The analysis draws on scholarship on the evolution of courthouses 
and the cultural implications of their architectural design. See CARL L. LOUNSBURY, THE 
COURTHOUSES OF EARLY VIRGINIA (2005); MARSHA J. MCNAMARA, FROM TAVERN TO 
COURTHOUSE 1658–1860 (2004);  see also VERNON, supra note 7 (noting similar trends in England, 
with the construction of town halls and other government buildings were linked to changes that 
formalized the political process). 
24. EDWARDS, supra note 5, at ch. 3. 
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it. They gave law respect of a particular kind, derived from close and frequent 
contact with a system that was integral to local culture. Respect did not take the 
form of blind obedience or unquestioning deference to legal authorities, whether 
in the form of written documents or of flesh-and-blood officials. To the contrary, 
they ignored or challenged those verdicts with which they did not agree precisely 
because they had enough confidence in the concept of law to believe that it could 
be engaged and changed. In this sense, acceptance of law represented faith in a 
concept that reached well beyond formal definitions or specific legal officials and 
institutions. Above all, ordinary people acted as if law was a system that should 
respond to their problems and could express their own conceptions of justice. 
Even people who had no reason to expect justice, such as free blacks, still had 
faith that the system should work this way. What people imagined law could do was 
as important as what law actually did for them. They involved themselves in the 
legal system because they believed that localized law could resolve their 
problems.25  
Those expectations extended beyond the local level into other parts of the 
legal system. Individual requests for private acts took up most of the state 
legislatures’ business; in the post-Revolutionary decades the volumes of public acts 
are slim by comparison. Private acts ranged as widely as complaints brought to 
magistrates, and included the incorporation of voluntary organizations, the 
chartering of businesses, grants of manumission, divorce, legitimization of 
children, and suspensions of existing laws in particular instances. Private acts 
expressed both the legislatures’ sovereign authority to make or modify law and 
southerners’ expectations that their legislatures would act on their behalf in 
personal matters in individualized ways. Divorce petitions, for instance, 
occasionally appeared on South Carolina’s legislative agenda, even though the 
state’s statutes did not allow it. Petitioners were not necessarily naive or ignorant 
of the law; they requested the legislature to use its power to make a new law 
specifically for them. As one man put it, “Your petitioner is well aware that your 
Honorable body by no means are in favor of dissolving the matrimonial tie,” but 
he thought that his case deserved special consideration and its own private act.26 
The demand for private acts added significantly to legislators’ workloads, 
sometimes extending their sessions for weeks. Frustrated representatives, stuck in 
inhospitable state capitols for indefinite periods of time, watched their own farms 
and businesses languish, while their frustrated constituents watched the costs of 
state government grow. The situation prompted various reform efforts. It 
contributed to calls for cost cutting, which many antebellum political historians 
have explained in terms of a peculiarly southern hostility toward big government. 
 
25. Id. at 79–90. 
26. Id. at 90–91; Petition for Divorce, Curtis Winget, microformed on General Assembly Records, 
S165015 (1830) (S.C. Dep’t of Hist. & Archives). 
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It also led to measures to limit the length of legislative sessions. The rhetoric of 
reform, however, was stronger than the commitment to it. In the abstract, 
everyone could agree that legislative calendars were too long and expenses were 
too high. In practice, no one really wanted the legislature to ignore his or her 
requests or those of their constituents.27  
The situation is captured in the ambiguity between “private acts” and “public 
acts.” In North Carolina, the Raleigh Register, which provided day-by-day reports on 
the General Assembly’s business, only started separating out “private acts” from 
“public acts” around 1809. Until then, it mixed them together, even when it listed 
the new laws published at the end of each legislative session. It is easy to see why 
the Register did not bother to make the distinction. In North Carolina, as 
elsewhere, many public acts were initiated in the same ways as private ones, 
through local initiative, usually by petitions and grand jury presentments.28 The 
difference was that the sources of public law usually came through a request 
authored by a group, rather than an individual, which claimed to represent the 
interests of a particular area or constituency. Yet many public acts, like private 
ones, addressed specific, highly localized problems. Typical was the 1814 grand 
jury presentment from South Carolina regarding the “frequent violation of the 
sacredness of the divine institution of Marriage.” People were living together as if 
they were married, but without being legally married, and then separating through 
customary practices and taking up new spouses. “It is conceived,” wrote the grand 
jurors, “that the laws of the State, are not sufficient effectually to prevent such 
dangerous and growing evils.” Apparently the available legal weapons, such as 
charges of vagrancy, disorderly conduct, and adultery or fornication, were 
insufficient. Therefore, they concluded, the legislature should pass a new law. The 
grand jurors’ confidence in law as the best means to address this issue is 
remarkable. Even more striking is their assurance that the legislature would 
comply. They were not disappointed. The Judiciary Committee, to which the 
presentment was referred, reported “that a bill should be brought in to punish 
infractions of the same.” Based on a “problem” identified by twenty-four grand 
jurors in a sparsely settled region, the legislature moved to make a public law that 
could apply to everyone in the state.29 
Many petitions recommended changes in statutes in order to address local 
problems. Neither petitioners nor legislators identified this as a contradiction, let 
alone a problem. Local people and legislators assumed that these problems lay 
within the legislature’s purview; and it should rally round, when called upon to do 
so. Moreover, people and their representatives thought it was appropriate for local 
issues to drive the framing of state law. “We your humble petitioners,” began a 
 
27. EDWARDS, supra note 5, at 90–98. 
28. Id. at 91.  
29. Id. at 91–92; Grand Jury Presentment, Pendleton District, microformed on General Assembly 
Records, S108093 (1814) (S.C. Dep’t of Hist. & Archives). 
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missive from Orangeburg District in South Carolina, “would esteem it as a 
fortunate circumstance if our domestic economy was under no necessity, of 
legislative intervention: but this is not the case.” After detailing local difficulties in 
regulating trade in the items that slaves produced themselves, the petitioners (not 
so humbly) deemed it “highly necessary” that “a law should be enacted this 
Session prohibiting negroes making cotton for themselves.”30 In the next session, 
the South Carolina legislature raised the penalties for trading with slaves, and 
specifically listed cotton, rice, tobacco, and indigo as prohibited items. Hogs, 
cattle, and corn were the problem in Beaufort District, according to Richard 
Dawson and ninety-one others. More to the point, the problem was absentee 
owners, whose slaves “not being restrained are in the constant habit of Killing the 
stock of Cattle and Hogs of the Neighbors adjoining them, and also of the taking 
their corn from their fields before it could with safety be housed.” The petitioners 
requested an increase in penalties for absentee owners with thirty or more slaves. 
The South Carolina General Assembly, whose members had to absent themselves 
from their plantations to fulfill their legislative duties, declined to act in this 
instance.31 The refusal of this or any other request did not signal any change in the 
system’s underlying dynamics. Petitions continued to arrive, penned by people 
who expected that their concerns would be taken up by the legislature, even if 
they did not lead to modifications in state laws. 
It was against this backdrop that legal reformers struggled to create a 
uniform body of state law, focused on abstract individuals, rather than the messy 
particulars of actual individuals’ lives. State leaders’ accounts, which posit the slow 
but steady defeat of localism and the development of state law, are accurate in the 
sense that state law did become more elaborate, sophisticated, and influential 
between 1787 and 1840. In other respects, however, they were proscriptive rather 
than descriptive. Even as state law expanded and covered more ground, its 
relationship to localized law was never as clear-cut as state leaders would have 
liked. Localized law, with the governing logic of the peace, continued to have 
considerable influence throughout the antebellum period and long afterward, even 
at the state level, because it was embedded in the culture in ways that made it very 
difficult to eliminate. Neither the legal system nor reformers’ narrative of legal 
history worked as they portrayed it.32 
To achieve their ends, legal reformers both extended the scope of state law 
and drew a clear hierarchy between “the state” and “the local.” The situation in 
 
30. EDWARDS, supra note 5, at 92–93; 1 THE SOUTHERN DEBATE OVER SLAVERY: 
PETITIONS TO SOUTHERN LEGISLATURES, 1778–1864, at 55, 56, 47–58 (Loren Schweninger ed., 
2001). Schweninger’s collection of petitions, from all southern states, suggests that these expectations 
were common; this collection is particularly revealing because it indicates whether and what action 
was taken on petitions. 
31. EDWARDS, supra note 5, at 92–93. THE SOUTHERN DEBATE, supra note 30, at 47–58.  
32. EDWARDS, supra note 5, at ch. 1, conclusion.  
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North Carolina and South Carolina is suggestive. In the 1820s, legal reformers 
began extending the reach of state law into areas previously left to local 
jurisdictions. Before then, reformers had been preoccupied with issues involving 
property, such as inheritance, contracts, sales, and other transfers—often referred 
to as private matters on what is now the civil side of the system. The legal texts of 
the time, produced by reformers and now used as primary sources by legal 
scholars, testify to those concerns. In them, property predominates, crowding out 
other issues. Reformers structured this emerging body of law around the logic of 
individual rights, drawing on the legal framework that had governed property 
issues even before the Revolution. Then, in the 1820s, reform-minded appellate 
justices and legislators in both states extended their interests beyond property and 
began applying the rubric of rights to criminal matters and other public issues. 
These new bodies of state law represented a marked departure from the states’ 
previous handling of public issues in key ways. Before the 1820s, legislatures and 
appellate courts had generated laws in this area sporadically and haphazardly, often 
in response to local concerns and not always with the expectation that state law 
would supersede local practice. In fact, state law recognized locally defined 
conceptions of the peace and incorporated localism into its approach to public 
matters. State law coexisted with localized law, although the two operated largely 
apart, with localized law occupying its own space within the legal system and 
operating according to its own logic. By the 1820s, however, reformers’ efforts at 
consolidation and systematization had achieved results. Legislatures and appellate 
courts acted with the assumption that they should be creating a uniform body of 
law in public matters, applicable throughout the state and superior to local 
practices. Instead of conceding the importance of localism when it came to public 
matters, the logic of these new statutes and appellate decisions upheld abstract 
conceptions of individual rights created and protected at the state level. Localized 
law now had a competitor with aspirations to dominance.33 
State leaders endeavored to legitimize the authority of state law by linking it 
to the rights of abstract individuals. In the late 1820s and 1830s, state leaders in 
both North Carolina and South Carolina mounted political campaigns that 
popularized the authority of the state and the rhetoric of rights—at least for adult 
white men. In South Carolina, the Nullification Movement consolidated state 
government more dramatically and more thoroughly than any previous reform 
effort. Leading Nullifiers came from the same ranks as legal reformers: they 
moved in state and national networks, considered government at those levels to be 
superior to local jurisdictions, supported state-building efforts, and advocated the 
creation of a coherent body of state law based in individual rights. Confronted 
with national policies that they considered detrimental to state interests, a core 
group of South Carolina’s leaders rallied to the state’s defense. In an amazingly 
 
33. EDWARDS, supra note 5, at 209–10; see also id. at 205–19, ch. 7, 8, conclusion. 
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well-orchestrated campaign, Nullifiers convinced the “freemen”—by which they 
meant white men—to identify with the state as the only entity that could preserve 
their liberty. The rhetoric of individual rights was deployed by both sides. While 
opposing Nullification, Unionists urged freemen to support their state and protect 
their rights by remaining loyal to the nation. The formulation, in both its 
Nullification and Unionist guises, placed free white men at the center of state 
politics and made them important in ways they never were within the political 
context of localism. They responded with such enthusiasm that their erstwhile 
leaders had difficulty controlling them.34 
In North Carolina, the political campaigns of the 1830s were less explosive, 
but no less decisive. The new state constitution of 1835 popularized the rhetoric 
of rights and the notion that it was the state’s job to protect those rights. The 
constitution also solidified the state legislature’s authority, by elevating the public 
business of the state government over the private matters of local jurisdictions, 
which involved specific individuals and communities. North Carolina’s new state 
capitol embodied these changes in physical form. The style and location of the 
building set it apart as a distinct place where the most important public business 
was conducted. It housed all the authoritative bodies that made up the state, not 
just the two houses of the legislature and the appellate court, but also the texts 
that comprised state law. But the capitol was not public in the sense that anyone 
could wander in and present their concerns. The building had no place for 
localized law, which was banished to localities. Also banished were the myriad of 
people who constituted localized law. They were replaced by the racial, class, and 
gendered abstractions of state law: freemen and their individual rights. The new 
state capitol demonstrated physically that state law, though not yet dominant, was 
nonetheless separate from localized law and the common people.35 
In 1835, North Carolina’s new constitution tried to institutionalize this new 
relationship between state law and localism by restricting the legislature’s handling 
of all “private legislation”—bills, including those providing divorces, that applied 
only to specific individuals, groups, or localities. While recognizing the authority 
of local jurisdictions, the amendments drew a sharp line between local issues and 
state issues, creating a distinct hierarchy between the two. The legislature now 
dealt exclusively with public issues of broad importance, which in theory affected 
everyone in the state. Local courts became subordinate legal bodies that 
specialized in the detritus of everyday life; they handled legal conflicts 
characterized as routine and private because they did not involve the 
interpretation of state law. The new state constitution shielded the state appellate 
court from legislative interference, ending locally minded legislators’ campaigns to 
undermine a centralized court system that upheld state law. Before 1835, localized 
 
34. Id. at 210–11; see also id. at ch. 8. 
35. Id. at 211; see also id. at ch. 8. 
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law had space within the state’s legal system: its rulings were part of the state’s 
body of laws, and its practices were recognized and accommodated within the 
state’s government. Although state leaders failed to eradicate localized law, they 
did manage to purge the logic and practices of localism from state law in theory. 
They rewrote the basic structures of North Carolina government in a way that not 
only clearly separated state law from localized law, but also established state law’s 
superiority—at least in the institutional structures of state government.36 
That separation, as imagined by state leaders and written into state 
government, did not mark the end of localized law because the culture of localism 
did not necessarily recognize the distinctiveness, let alone the superiority of laws 
generated at the state level. Localized law continued to operate in the districts and 
counties of the Carolinas as it always had, unless it was interrupted by officials 
who were intent on imposing the edicts of the state. It also wandered into the 
corridors of state government, despite efforts to keep it out. The peace as it 
operated at the local level had always accommodated multiple—even 
conflicting—legal traditions, so it was possible for people to embrace rights 
discourse, as developed at the state level, while still adhering to conflicting tenets 
of the local system. People might represent their interests in local courts in terms 
of rights, but the localized system continued to incorporate their claims just as it 
had always done with other claims on the peace.37 
This dynamic relationship between law as practiced by states and localities 
suggests that localities actually provide productive places from which to develop 
larger generalizations about law and government, particularly in the immediate 
post-Revolutionary decades. It is not so much the places as the legal logic that is 
important. In the logic of the localized system, state laws did not necessarily 
control local practice, define the needs of the peace in local areas, or constitute a 
definitive body of law uniformly applicable throughout the state. They were just 
another set of legal principles generated in a different place. In fact, because the 
state was a different place, its laws often do not represent the practices of other 
places particularly well.  
Localities also provide a better basis for generalizations that can account for 
differences among the nation’s various regions and provide a truly national 
history. The focus of my research has been the South, a place often deemed either 
exceptional or backward and certainly not representative of the national 
experience. That is because of the frame of reference. Usually, state-level laws and 
institutions are compared to each other, a framework that is problematic because 
it assumes what did not yet exist: already-constituted states that would eventually 
form distinct regions. The historiographic power of southern exceptionalism 
complicates matters because it imposes dynamics from the Civil War era on an 
 
36. Id. at 215; see also id. at 205–09, ch. 8. 
37. Id. at 211; see also id. at conclusion. 
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earlier period when “the South,” as a unified region, did not yet exist.38 Changing 
the perspective and bringing local jurisdictions into focus widens the perspective 
so as to include the South—and other areas of the country—within narratives of 
legal history. That contrast, between localized law with its emphasis on the peace 
and legal developments at the state level with their emphasis on abstractions and 
uniformity, highlights striking similarities between the southern states and states in 
the rest of the nation. In the early nineteenth century, southern states developed 
centralized government institutions with rationalized bodies of law, just like states 
elsewhere in the United States. Reform-minded southern leaders drew on political 
principles usually associated with the liberal state in the North: private property, 
individual rights, and a limited but theoretically democratic government that 
protected those rights and encouraged individual initiative.39  
The inclusion of a broader geographic area within the narrative of legal 
history also recasts the development of a system based on individual rights. The 
historiography usually associates such a legal system with the expansion of 
individual liberties and expansion of democracy. In the context of a slave society, 
however, those principles resulted in extreme legal inequalities and rigid political 
exclusions. As southern lawmakers extended the reach of state law, they imposed 
the rubric of individual rights on matters formerly governed by collective 
conceptions of the peace, as defined in local contexts. The logic behind the 
developing body of state law turned white men’s patriarchal authority and civic 
participation into individual rights, akin to their already established property rights. 
White men’s rights expanded at this level of the legal system, increasing their 
claims on the legal system and to state protection of their interests. In the political 
rhetoric of the 1830s, they became “freemen,” legally recognized individuals who 
were the paradigmatic citizens, at least within the realm of state law. White men 
were constituted as freemen through their rights over those without rights. At the 
same time, dependents’ legal status, particularly their lack of rights, became the 
rationale for their exclusion from law and government. State law defined them as 
altogether different categories of legal persons and subordinated them according 
to the abstract categories of race, class, and/or gender. White women, African 
Americans, and the poor found it difficult to make themselves heard and their 
 
38. Id. at 13–14. There is a vast literature that takes southern exceptionalism as a description of 
the South’s actual differences from the North. But there is also a body of scholarship that takes a 
more critical view, arguing that southern exceptionalism serves cultural and historiographical 
purposes, by isolating national problems, displacing them onto one region, and thus allowing for 
direct and critical explorations of them. C. VANN WOODWARD, THE BURDEN OF SOUTHERN 
HISTORY (3d ed. 1993) is the classic statement—actually meditation—on southern exceptionalism 
and the connections between the South and the United States. See also Larry J. Griffin, Why Was the 
South a Problem to America?, in THE SOUTH AS AN AMERICAN PROBLEM 1–32 (Larry J. Griffin & Don 
H. Doyle eds., 1995); THE SOUTHERNER AS AMERICAN (Charles Grier Sellers Jr. ed., 1960); Laura F. 
Edwards, Southern History as U.S. History, 75 J. SOC. HIST. 1 (2009). 
39. EDWARDS, supra note 5, at 15. See also EDWARDS, id., at ch. 1, 7, 8. 
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concerns visible within the body of state law, because they were excluded from the 
category of people with rights the state was designed to protect.40 
In extending this legal framework, state leaders applied the precepts of liberal 
individualism to the patriarchal structure of localized law. They abstracted the 
authority white men already exercised in social contexts, through their obligations 
to the peace in localized law, and individualized both its privileges and restrictions. 
In practice, though, state leaders’ vision of democracy did not include 
fundamental changes in the economic or social structure that would put all white 
men on equal footing. Legislators and jurists defined rights narrowly so as to 
affirm existing inequalities among white men and to protect the property interests 
of the wealthy, particularly their property in slaves. By the 1830s, freemen could 
look to the state to protect their rights, defined in the limited, abstract terms of 
law at that level of the system. But many of the white men included in this 
category could not count on those rights as a means to articulate, let alone 
promote their interests.41 
While dynamics in the South are usually considered unrepresentative of 
national trends, they paralleled developments in the North, where recent 
historiography has emphasized growing inequality, expressed in categorical terms 
of race, class, and gender and linked to the spread of liberal individualism. When 
the analysis includes localities, made visible by recognition of the peace as a legal 
construct, southern legal history provides insights into the origins and 
reconstitution of inequality in the nation as a whole. As the history of the South 
indicates, the extension of rights to new portions of the population is only part of 
the story: the meanings given to individual rights were—and are—as important as 
their distribution. Although rights exist as abstractions in law, they are always 
applied in context. Without political backing and a strong commitment to 
democracy and equality, a government based in the protection of individual rights 
can lead in profoundly oppressive directions. In the South, the same principles 
that we usually associate with individual liberty, democracy, and equality were 
mobilized in defense of slavery, the nation’s most potent symbol of tyranny and 
repression. We usually treat slavery as an exception that can be explained by its 
divergence from national principles, but the system of vesting some with rights in 
the labor and bodies of others was far more pervasive than many Americans like 
to recognize. The principles of equal rights were—and still are—extended in 
democratic directions only by political struggle.42 
 
40. Id. at 9; see also id. at ch. 7. 
41. Id. at 9–10; see also id. at ch. 8. 
42. Id. at 16; see also id. at ch. 8 
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IV. CONCLUSION 
The peace is conceptually useful because it reinforces approaches that 
already define the best legal history in the field. It forces us to confront the 
presence of multiple, even conflicting traditions within the law, instead of 
displacing them onto society or debating which is really the authoritative 
expression of the law. More than that, the peace forces us to deal with those 
complications within legal history, instead of relegating them outside the bounds of 
the field. The challenge is to think more critically about what the law is, at any 
given time, and what that means for the way we understand the law in our own 
historical moment. Who defines the law? Where it is located? What does it do? 
The framework of the peace suggests that those questions are more difficult than 
they seem. The answers, moreover, lead not to pluralism, with its easy affirmation 
of multiple legal traditions and the resulting obfuscation of power dynamics that 
elevate some of those traditions over others. Rather, they lead to different 
historical narratives, in which it is possible to tell a national legal history by 
looking locally and by emphasizing the place ordinary people have had in making 
law. 
The results would also connect the field of legal history more directly and 
more productively to other historical subfields. In one sense, the field of legal 
history has become something of an outlier in the historical profession. Among 
historians outside legal history, the perception is that the scholarship in the field is 
insular and difficult to penetrate because the central issues in the field have 
developed in ways that appear disconnected from the debates in other fields. 
Books that are widely known in the field are not known outside it. Even the 
designation “legal history” can make it difficult for a book to find a wider 
audience. In another sense, however, legal history maintains a high profile in the 
historical profession. Historians of all varieties rely heavily on legal sources and 
incorporate analyses of the law into their scholarship. Often, however, these 
historians do such work without ever engaging with legal historians. That 
juxtaposition—between the marginalization of the field and the centrality of the 
topic—provides both a caution and challenge. We need new frameworks to widen 
the scope of the field, lest we lose control over it.  
 
  
